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4 Although Food Power: The Rise and Fall of the Postwar American Food System concerns roughly
the years  1945-1975,  the importance of  McDonald’s  book for  today’s  food security  is
tremendous.  In  his  capacity  as  a  Sherwin  Early  Career  Professor  in  the  Rock  Ethics
Institute and Associate Professor of History at Penn State University, Bryan McDonald
delves into American history to explore American national security and national interests
through  the  deployment  of  food  in  the  years  after  World  War  II.  Like  his  earlier
publication – Food Security (Polity Press, 2010) in which McDonald investigated the late
twentieth century origins of contemporary food security challenges – Food Power proves
both timely and relevant to early twenty-first country food challenges and threats (food
sovereignty, food security, malnutrition and obesity, food sustainability, etc). McDonald’s
research proves pertinent to the current situation, as food “has been a focus of national
security in the past, and in ways that affected global affairs, improved America’s standing
in the world, and reduced global hunger and deprivation … food is unlikely to ever be a
solved  problem.  Instead,  it  should  be  seen  as  a  landscape  of  challenges  that  each
generation must take up again for themselves, to consider anew how to best fulfill their
food needs and wants” (197). 
5 “Introduction: Food Power, the Food Network, and American Security” familiarizes the
readers  with the concept  of  food power as  an element of  national  power.  McDonald
explains that food power was used “as a demonstration of the good life that was enjoyed
by a larger and larger number of people,” or “as a valuable weapon in the arsenal of
democracy  at  a  time when the  global  need for  food was  rising”  (2).  In  this  concise
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introduction McDonald presents food as a means of control:  as a way “to accomplish
diplomatic goals” (3) or “a softer form of power, deployed through the avenues of trade
or foreign assistance” (4). Thus, food power includes using food as a weapon to improve
national security, for example by imposing food embargos (as a disciplining measure),
through aid programs and reconstruction assistance (Food for Peace), and using food as a
commodity  in  global  exchange.  McDonald  also  skillfully  identifies  pre-1945  changes
which helped shape American food power: improvements in transportation, the rise of
large food processors,  the science of  nutrition,  and changes in farming (10).  He also
analyzes why the post-1970s food system evolved into the contemporary food network,
with an emphasis on “investigating the aims that motivated the American policymaking
efforts responsible for its development” (10). 
6 McDonald identifies  the perfect  storm of  the world food crisis  between 1972-74 as  a
threshold of change from a food system to food networks. He explains that food networks
“are interconnected systems that allow sharing between systems and contain regularized
interactions between nodes of activity” (9). According to McDonald, the New World Food
Order since the 1970s is not a “relatively stable, American-driven postwar food system,”
but rather a network which is  “a complex and ever shifting landscape where states,
companies,  international  organizations,  nongovernmental  groups,  individuals,  and
communities advance and contest visions of ideal food relationships” (7). The thorough
scholarship  and  historical  research  which  undergirds  McDonald’s  book  and  its
contemporary relevance are undeniable assets of Food Power. McDonald uses this book to
“explain contemporary challenges related to ensuring food security, at a time when we
are still grappling with the expectations and goals of the postwar food system, even if we
are no longer living and working within its parameters” (10). 
7 The book’s chapters are ordered chronologically, tracing the rise and fall of the postwar
food  system.  Chapter  one,  “Freedom  from  Want:  Creating  a  Postwar  Food  System,”
explores  America’s  role  in  postwar  reconstruction  efforts.  The  subchapter  about  the
world  food  system  before  and  during  World  War  II  is  informative,  with  concise
information  about  Liberty  gardens,  farmers’  dislocation,  the  Great  Depression,  field
kitchens and food rationing,  which sheds some light on the complexities of  the food
system. American surpluses (unprecedented agricultural abundance in the years after the
war)  were  used  to  relieve  humanitarian  crises  and  revitalize  European  economies.
Foreign nations in need received financial and material aid, which America provided in
the form of reconstruction and recovery plans. More than just a charitable act, sending
surpluses  abroad  to  war-torn  Europe  –  through  for  instance  the  Marshall  Plan  –
“advanced American vital interests and national security” (46). Food was connected with
national security and was intended to “promote postwar reconstruction and serve as a
bulwark against communism” (12). As such, food power meant a display of national power
(46). The decision to export surpluses had two dimensions: on the one hand “eliminating
world hunger was central to visions of a postwar world” (29); on the other “advancing
national interests” meant “ensuring national security” (47). 
8 Chapter  two,  “Fixed  Stomachs  and  Convenience  Foods:  Abundance  and  Food  in  the
1950s,” tackles the issue of the use of American abundance, which symbolized prosperity
in the Cold War. It is most visible in the 1959 Kitchen Debate between Richard Nixon and
Nikita Khrushchev at the American National Exhibition in Moscow. McDonald brilliantly
demonstrates that this “vision of prosperity and consumerism was one of the country’s
most  powerful  pieces  of  propaganda  during  the  Cold  War”  (49).  Capitalism  and
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consumerism were effective weapons against communism while “an abundance of food
provided America with a powerful but peaceful weapon” (51). Consumption of goods was
to be an effective vaccine against socialist and/or communist systems. Thus, “consuming
modern convenience foods was a way for Americans to express patriotism and national
identity” (49).  The American restaurantscape evolved through the invention of drive-
throughs and the consolidation of  the position of  fast  food chains.  The supermarket
became a symbol of the superiority and efficiency of the American system (51). Americans
took advantage of “advances in food science and technology” (convenient, frozen and
processed foods) and food marketing to “link local, regional, and national food chains”
(49). Yet despite those conveniences, emerging health concerns about vitamins, nutrients,
and calories clouded the idealized image (64), while falling rural prosperity emerged as
the underbelly  of  the abundance of  the 1950s.  A crisis  was  looming on the horizon:
American families were spending more on food, while farmers were earning less (51; 72). 
9 Chapter three, “Freedom to Farm: Prosperity, Security, and ‘the Farm Problem’,” touches
on  “the  efforts  to  shape  farm  policy  to  preserve  small-scale  farming  and  eliminate
surpluses even as the modern agricultural revolution was beginning to produce historic
and ever-increasing harvests” (13). If food surpluses were unavoidable (they depressed
farm prices, hurting rural prosperity, and raised the costs of federal farm programs and
food-storage efforts), then it was believed that at least they “could be harnessed as a
powerful and deployable weapon to use in addressing foreign policy goals” (72). Food aid
and assistance abroad killed two birds with one stone: they fed people and stabilized
domestic and foreign food markets (13). Eisenhower’s administration – with secretary of
agriculture  Ezra  Benson  as  its  vocal  advocate  –  undertook  various  initiatives
(mechanization, new technologies,  and scientific advances) to solve the farm problem
(104).  Despite  their  various  efforts,  interventionism  (which  weakened  farmers’  self
sufficiency (88)) and other government programs did not solve the farm problem. Yet,
Benson’s claim about agriculture – “get big or get out” – is more applicable than ever to
the  present  agricultural  situation  of  Monsanto  seeding  fear  among  small  farmers.
Benson’s  fears  of  “undue  government  intervention  in  agriculture”  and  of  “farmers
producing not for markets and in response to consumer demand, but to sell crops to
government programs that offered guaranteed prices” (104) came true at the beginning
of the 21st century. 
10 Chapter four, “What to Eat after an Atomic Bomb: Deploying Food Power Defensively”
presents research that is also relevant to the contemporary socio-economic landscape. In
the 1950s plans for building shelters and stockpiling food “were developed to protect
Americans, arms, and livestock from nuclear war” (13). Similarly, today “preppers” plan
what to do in the event of nuclear attack. Again, food power was used during the Cold
War to  utilize  American abundance and enhance national  security.  Experts  and civil
defense  planners  worked  to  engage  individuals  in  “self-help”  and  DIY  civil  defense
efforts. This chapter details “the various political and practical issues involved in the
attempts to create a civil defense system built around shelters and helps to explain why …
so few Americans actually built shelters” (106). Construction of civilian shelters entailed
problems connected with stockpiling on the level of individual civilians. Such issues as
food  safety,  food  perishability,  and  “high-calorie,  low-spoilage  foods”  (120-121)
represented a conflict of interests between two agendas within food politics: on the one
hand civil defense stockpiling necessitated agricultural surpluses, and on the other the
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government was trying to reduce those surpluses in order to solve the farm problem
(125). 
11 The role of food in the efforts of J. F. Kennedy’s and Lyndon Johnson’s administrations to
promote peace and stability in global affairs along with efforts to manage or reduce food
surpluses in the domestic arena is the subject of the fifth chapter, “Food for Peace and the
War  on  Hunger:  Food  Power  in  the  1960s.”  McDonald  explores  the  administrations’
twofold approach to the farm problem: enhanced domestic aid programs (food stamps,
free school lunches) and an increase in international food aid, in both the public and the
private sector. He explains that under Kennedy’s and Johnson’s presidencies the scope of
American food power expanded to include various American assistance programs and
humanitarian  assistance.  America  distributed  food  surpluses  but  also  the  know-how
needed  to  produce  food.  During  the  Cold  War  food  was  an  important  element  in
establishing Soviet-American relations, especially after a Soviet food crisis. The chapter
ends with a discussion of the “Green Revolution” of the 1960s, which addressed the issues
of global food insecurity, although this was a private (e.g. the Rockefeller Foundation)
rather than governmental endeavor. 
12 The analytical threads are brought together nicely in the sixth chapter, “The World Food
Crisis  and  the  End  of  the  Postwar  Food  System.”  The  long  awaited  elimination  of
agricultural  abundance  (through  food  assistance  programs)  during  the  Nixon
administration, combined with changes in domestic agricultural policy, political decisions
(selling grain to the Soviet Union at subsidized prices), environmental shocks (extreme
weather events), a demographic boom in the context of a Malthusian catastrophe, and
economic  shocks  (the  “Nixon  shock”/price-freeze)  together  created  a  perfect  storm
which  ended  the  postwar  food  system.  The  food  system is  dead;  long  live  the  food
network. 
13 The results of the efforts to manage unprecedented agricultural abundance exceeded the
expectations  of  US  presidents  and  policymakers.  McDonald  presents  a  rich  array  of
evidence to demonstrate that food surpluses were gladly used to stabilize food prices and
to offer food assistance programs domestically and internationally during the Cold War.
However, with political/ economic/ demographic/ environmental turbulence, America
was no longer willing and able to devote the lion’s share of its abundance with the rest of
the world in the 1970s. With no single country able to fill America’s shoes in the wake of
the food crisis  of  1972-74,  the world food network was born.  McDonald convincingly
demonstrates  that  the  structure  of  a  network  –  with  local,  regional,  national,  and
transnational food systems amalgamated into one network – has a greater potential to
meet global nutritional needs:  “the world food network links food chains at multiple
scales in a complex and rapidly shifting web of food relations that provides the world’s
growing number of people with food on a day-to-day basis” (191). Food networks are less
vulnerable  to  state  monopoly  but  still  have  to  deal  with  “climate  change  and
transnational threats such as terrorism, pandemics, and cybercrime, all empowered by
global information and transportation networks” (192). 
14 And if there is any weakness in the book, it is perhaps the fact that McDonald offers only
a glimpse of some conceptual ground concerning the pre-1945 social/economic/historical
situation in the USA.  I  believe that  potentially  illuminating and explanatory insights
concerning Victory gardens deserve more than just a mention in the first chapter, even if
this issue is outside the historical purview of the book. The scanty, explanatory insights
into the rhetoric during the First World War surrounding War Gardens does not do them
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sufficient justice in the context of their importance for civilian support for the larger war
effort and the ongoing war on hunger. About 25 percent of total food production in 1943
went to the armed forces and to allies. Thus, planting Victory Gardens, as a patriotic
cause, set a precedent in civilian input into American Food Power. Later on, in the 1990’s,
Michael Pollan, an environmental writer, would suggest we should “Abolish the White
House Lawn.” In March 2009, even Michelle Obama would set an example by planting a
“kitchen garden” at the White House, as did Eleanor Roosevelt in 1943 during another
national crisis. 
15 Food Power is a highly readable, perceptive and thought-provoking book, which provides
rich, well-documented insights into American Postwar Food Power. McDonald’s study will
prove extremely insightful and edifying for readers with a background in history, politics
or critical food studies. 
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